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JULIE CLARKE*
I INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
  
[In 2003 the Dawson Committee, commissioned by the Government, recommended 
that criminal penalties should be introduced for cartel conduct.  The Government 
accepted this recommendation in principle and set up a working party to consider 
the implementation difficulties that had been identified in the Dawson Report.  
Nothing further was heard from the Government until February 2005 when the 
Government announced that it would introduce criminal penalties for serious cartel 
conduct.  This paper evaluates the Government proposals and makes suggestions 
for their implementation.] 
 
 
Following a significant push, particularly by the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (the ACCC),1
                                                          
*  Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University.  
 
1  See, e.g., Press Release, ACCC, ACCC calls for stronger criminal sanctions including jail sentences 
for price-fixing offences under Trade Practices Act, (June 8, 2001), available at 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87750/fromItemId/378012 and Professor Allan 
Fels, The Trades Practices Act and world's best practice: Proposals for criminal penalties for hard core 
collusion, Speech to the Australian Institute of Criminology (Sept. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/110787/fromItemId/8973. 
 to introduce criminal penalties for serious 
breaches of the anti-competitive provisions of the TPA, the Government has re-
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cently announced it will introduce such penalties, including jail terms, for serious 
cartel conduct.2
This announcement should be welcomed.  Criminal penalties are appropriate for 
this type of conduct which costs the worldwide economy many billions of dollars 
each year.
   
 
3
II EXISTING REGIME FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 
  The new penalties will, combined with other announced reforms, 
provide a serious deterrent to individuals and corporations who might otherwise 
consider engaging in cartel conduct. 
 
This paper will outline and critique the Government’s proposals for criminal sanc-
tions for certain forms of anti-competitive conduct and will make recommendations 
for the implementation of those proposals.  First, however, the existing civil regime 
will be outlined followed by a discussion of the Dawson Report and related calls for 
criminalisation that have led to the current proposals.  The threshold issue of 
whether criminal sanctions should be available for cartel conduct will also be ad-
dressed. 
 
 
‘Cartel’ encompasses any form of conduct between competitors designed to limit 
the amount of competition in the markets in which they operate.  The most common 
and pernicious forms of cartel conduct involve price fixing, bid rigging, output 
restrictions and market sharing arrangements between competitors.  These forms of 
conduct are all prohibited, directly or indirectly, by Part IV of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’).  Most of the more common forms of cartel conduct are 
currently prohibited per se, without need to prove anti-competitive consequences, 
through a combination of s 45 of the TPA and either s 4D4 or 45A.5
                                                          
2  Press Release, Australian Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour (Feb. 2 2005), 
available at <http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2005/004.asp>.  These penalties will 
be introduced in the form of the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct) Bill 2005: Press Release, 
Australian Treasurer and Australian Minister for Small Business and Tourism, Government Progressing 
Trade Practices Act Reforms (Mar. 10 2005), available at 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2005/013.asp>.   
3  See, e.g., OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS 5 (OECD 2000) (referring to ‘cartels’ multi-billion dollar 
drain on the global economy’) and OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE 
CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 2 (OECD 2002) 
(noting that while difficult to quantify accurately, a conservative estimate of the worldwide economic 
harm from cartels is that ‘it exceeds many billions of U.S. dollars per year). 
4  This section defines exclusionary provisions (more commonly referred to as boycotts) which are 
prohibited by s 45.  The definition goes beyond traditional boycott scenarios and may capture some 
forms of cartel conduct. 
5  This section deems price fixing to substantially lessen competition for the purposes of s 45, thus 
rendering price fixing, which is likely to also incorporate most forms of output restrictions and market 
sharing, a per se offence under the TPA. 
  Conduct not 
caught by the per se prohibition will still be caught by s 45 if it can be demonstrated 
that competition has been, or is likely to be, substantially lessened. 
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Where a contravention of any of these prohibitions is proved, the TPA currently 
provides for a system of civil remedies, including pecuniary penalties, to be im-
posed by the Federal Court, with no opportunity for criminal punishment, either in 
the form of fines or incarceration.6   Currently penalties of up to $10m are available 
for corporations and up to $500,000 for individuals.7  This figure is, however, likely 
to increase in the near future as a result of the Trade Practices Legislation Amend-
ment Bill (No. 1) 2005 (‘Amendment Bill’) which was introduced into Parliament on 
17 February 2005.8  This bill, if passed as expected,9 will significantly increase the 
maximum penalties for corporations to the higher of $10m or 3 times the benefit 
gained from the contravention or, if that cannot be determined, 10% of the annual 
turnover of the corporation.10
In addition to these pecuniary penalties, the ACCC can seek other remedies for 
contraventions of Part IV, including declarations that the conduct was unlawful, 
injunctions banning repeat conduct or requiring the person involved to undertake 
compliance training or put in place compliance systems within the company, dam-
ages for those who have suffered loss and other orders, such as adverse publicity 
orders.
  There is no proposed change to the maximum pecu-
niary penalty for individuals.   
 
11  If the Amendment Bill is passed it will also give the Court the power to 
make an order disqualifying an individual found to have contravened Part IV of the 
TPA from acting in the management of a company12 and will prevent a corporation 
indemnifying an individual in respect of pecuniary penalties incurred as a result of a 
proved contravention of Part IV.13
A leniency policy for cartel conduct also exists
  Further, private action may be brought by par-
ties who can demonstrate loss as a result of the cartel. 
 
14
                                                          
6  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 78 (Cth) (‘[c]riminal proceedings do not lie against a person by reason 
only that the person: (a) has contravened … a provision of Part IV …’).  
7   Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 76(1) (Cth).  Despite the size of the penalties available, in practice courts 
have been reluctant to apply penalties approaching the maximum available: see David Round, An 
empirical analysis of price-fixing penalties in Australia from 1974 to 1999: Have Australia's corporate 
colluders been corralled?, 8 COMPETITION C.L.J. 83, 95 (2000): ‘judges have been reluctant to raise 
penalties by anywhere near an amount commensurate with the new maximum.’  See also Energex, 
Submission to the Committee of Inquiry Into the Competition Law Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
1974, and Their Administration, Public Submission 46, Trade Practices Act Review, 6 (2002).  
8 This bill replaces the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 2004 (Cth) which lapsed on 31 
August 2004 as a result of the October 2004 federal election. 
9  The Government’s majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate from 1 July 2005 
means the bill is likely to face few if any obstacles in passing through Parliament. 
10  The changes will occur via a new sub-section 76(1A): Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 
(No. 1) 2005, schedule 9, § 4. 
11  See further Jennifer McNeill, Understanding prohibited cartel behaviour in order to minimise the risk 
of prosecution, Speech delivered at the Lexis Nexis Trade Practices Conference, Sydney (Sept. 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/536495/fromItemId/8973. 
12  See Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005, schedule 9, part 2. 
13  See Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005, schedule 9, part 3. 
14 ACCC, ACCC LENIENCY POLICY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT (2003) available at  
 for the purpose of assisting detec-
tion and prosecution.  This policy enables a cartel participant – corporate or indi-
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/454181. This policy came into effect at 9am on 30 
June 2003: see Press Release, ACCC, ACCC launches leniency policy to expose hard core cartels in 
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vidual - to confess to the ACCC and, provided they are the first to come clean and 
the ACCC is not already aware of the cartel, they will receive amnesty from legal 
challenge by the ACCC.15  This policy has proved an effective mechanism in help-
ing to detect and prosecute cartel conduct, with half the current 25 cartel investiga-
tions arising from business admissions.16
Finally, the current system of cartel regulation provides for certain exemptions, 
such as certain joint venture activities and the exercise of certain intellectual prop-
erty rights
 
 
17 and all forms of cartel conduct may be ‘authorised’ by the ACCC 
where it can be demonstrated the public benefit of the conduct ‘outweighs or would 
outweigh the detriment to the public’ in the form of reduced competition18 or, in the 
case of exclusionary provisions, would result in such benefit to the public that it 
should be allowed to be made.19
III CALLS FOR CRIMINALISATION AND THE DAWSON 
COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS  
   
 
Calls for criminalisation of cartel conduct 
On 9 June 2001 Professor Allan Fels, then Chairman of the ACCC, called for the 
introduction of criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for ‘hard core breaches 
of Part IV’ including ‘the most serious, flagrant and profitable acts of collusion 
such as price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging’.20
The ACCC’s submission to the 2002 Trade Practices Inquiry, chaired by Sir Daryl 
Dawson (The Dawson Review)
   
 
21
                                                                                                                                       
Australia ACCC launches leniency policy to expose hard core cartels in Australia, (June 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/346231/fromItemId/378016. 
15  There are certain other criteria that must be met to ensure immunity, set out in ACCC, ACCC  
LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 14.  Note that the immunity only applies to ACCC-initiated proceedings 
so that corporations or individuals who satisfy the policy might still be subject to private actions.  
Importantly, however, private applicants do not have the power to bring an action for a pecuniary 
penalty. 
16 ACCC puts heat on 25 potential cartels (Feb. 17, 2005) available at ABC online  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200502/s1305026.html. 
17 For joint venture exemptions see Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45A(2) (Cth) and for intellectual 
property exemptions see Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 51 (Cth). 
18  Trade Practices Act, 1974, §§ 88(1), 90(7) (Cth). 
19  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 90(8) (Cth). 
20  Allan Fels, Regulating in a High-Tech Marketplace, paper presented at the Penalties: Policy, Princi-
ples and Practice in Government Regulation Conference, Sydney (June 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/255481/fromItemId/8973. See also Press Release, 
ACCC, ACCC Calls for Stronger Criminal Sanctions, supra note 1.  Note that the introduction of 
criminal penalties had also previously been considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission.  See 
e.g. Stephen Corones, Penalties for price-fixing: a built-in feature of how we do business in Australia?, 
24 AUSTRALIAN B. L. REV. 160, 163 (1996). 
21  The Trade Practices Act Review was announced on 15 October 2001. Information about the Review, 
including all non-confidential public submissions is available from its web site,  
http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au. 
 formalised their call for criminal penalties.  Spe-
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cifically, the ACCC proposed the introduction of criminal penalties for corporations 
and executives found to have engaged in hard-core cartel conduct22 to operate in 
conjunction with the existing civil penalty regime.23 Broadly, this would prohibit 
agreements to fix prices, limit output, share markets and rig bids. 24  Upon convic-
tion, it was proposed that a maximum custodial sentence of 7 years25 should apply 
for individuals and, for corporations, a fine ‘at the same maximum level that would 
apply if the contravention were civil’ should be imposed.26
The ACCC also originally proposed certain legislative ‘safeguards’ to ensure crimi-
nal sanctions would not be applied ‘inappropriately’.
  
 
27 These safeguards would 
include applying the criminal sanctions only to conduct carried out ‘by, or in, large 
corporations’28 – so as to exclude small business, trade unions and farmers29 - and 
ensuring that the offences be tried by a judge and jury with a requirement that the 
jury verdict be unanimous before a conviction is made.30  While the second of these 
recommendations sparked little comment, the proposal to restrict criminal sanctions 
to large corporations evoked considerable criticism and the ACCC subsequently 
proposed that ‘the criminalisation of hard-core cartel behaviour for all, and not just 
large, corporations’.31
The Dawson Committee reported to the Treasurer in January 2003 and the report 
was released to the public on 16 April 2003.  The Committee recommended the 
introduction of criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for serious cartel behav-
 
 
The Dawson Committee’s recommendations 
                                                          
22  ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, Public Submission 50, Trade Practices Act 
Review, 35 (2002). 
23 This proposal has prompted significant debate. A majority of the 212 submissions to the Dawson 
Review addressed the issue of criminal penalties for hard-core cartels, with opinions sharply divided.  
24 ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, supra note 22, at 35. Specifically, the ACCC 
has proposed that  
… in addition [to] the existing civil offences, new criminal offences be created to crimi-
nalise agreements (contracts, arrangements or understandings) between competitors that 
would directly or indirectly: fix a price of a product or service; limit or prevent supply or 
production of a product or service; restrict the ability of the parties to the agreement to 
freely supply specified goods or services or to freely supply goods or services to speci-
fied customers; in response to a request for tenders, restrict the freedom of one or more of 
the parties to the agreement to put in independent tenders’.  
25  ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, supra note 22, at 54.  
26  Id. at 54.  In this respect the ACCC also proposed increasing the level of civil penalties: Id. at 54-58.   
27  Id. at 21. 
28 This aspect of the ACCC’s proposal was heavily criticised, even by many who support the introduc-
tion of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Australian Business Limited, Submission to the Review of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 112, Trade Practices Act Review, 3 (2002) and Telstra Corpora-
tion Ltd, Initial Submission by Telstra Corporation Limited to the Dawson Committee Review of the 
Trade Practices Act, Public Submission 117, Trade Practices Act Review, 109-110 (2002.   
29 ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, supra note 22, at 41.  
30 Id. at 21, 43-49.  
31  SIR DARYL DAWSON, JILLIAN SEGAL AND CURT RENDALL, REVIEW OF THE COMPETITION 
PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 149 (Commonwealth of Australia, January 2003) (‘Dawson 
Report’) available at http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/report.asp. 
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iour,32 subject to solutions being found to certain problems they had identified.  No 
endeavour was made to define ‘serious cartel conduct’, although the Committee did 
observe that there were ‘undeniable difficulties in defining a criminal offence which 
covers only serious cartel behaviour.’33
In addition to recommending the introduction of criminal penalties, the Dawson 
Committee recommended amendments to the civil penalty regime for Part IV of the 
TPA, encompassing cartel conduct.  In particular, it recommended that the maxi-
mum pecuniary penalty for corporations be significantly increased,
   
 
34 that the Court 
be given the power to exclude an individual involved in a contravention from being 
‘a director of a corporation or being involved in its management’35 and that corpo-
rations be prohibited from indemnifying its ‘officers, employees or agents’ for 
pecuniary penalties they might receive.36
The Commonwealth Government accepted ‘in principle’ that criminal penalties 
may provide a more effective deterrent than civil penalties,
   
 
Government Response to the Dawson Report 
37 and subsequently set 
up a working party comprising officials from Treasury, the ACCC, the Attorney-
General’s office and the Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP)38
Despite the expectation that the Working Party would report to the Treasurer by the 
end of 2003,
 (‘Working Party’) to identify and resolve the implementation problems that 
had been identified in the Dawson Report.   
 
39
                                                          
32  Id. at 164, rec 10.1. This recommendation was made on the priviso that identified problems, including 
developing a ‘satisfactory definition of serious cartel behaviour’ first be resolved. 
33  Id. at 155.  The key problems identified by the Committee were that ‘a satisfactory definition of 
serious cartel behaviour needs to be developed and there needs to be a workable method of combining a 
clear and certain leniency policy with a criminal regime’ (161-162). 
34  Id. at 164, rec 10.2.1.  It was recommended that the penalties ‘be raised to be the greater of $10 
million or three times the gain from the contravention or, where gain cannot be readily ascertained, 10 
per cent of the turnover of the body corporate and all of its interconnected bodies corporate’. 
35  Id. at 165, rec 10.2.2.   
36  Id. at 165, rec 10.2.3.   
37  Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Government Response to the Review of the Competition  
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 10 (April 2003) available at  
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/publications/TPAResponse.asp. 
38  See Press Release, Australian Treasurer, Working Party to Examine Criminal Sanctions for Cartel 
Behaviour (Oct. 3, 2003) available at  
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2003/086.asp>. 
39 Id. 
 little or nothing more was heard from the Government on this issue 
until 2 February 2005 when it announced its intent to introduce criminal sanctions.  
The Working Party’s report to the Treasurer has not been released, nor have any 
formal documents containing specifics of any proposed legislative amendments or 
guidelines, and they are unlikely to be in the near future as the Government consults 
with the States prior to the introduction of legislation.  
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Regardless of form, it is anticipated that the new laws criminalising certain cartel 
conduct will be in place by the end of the year.40  It is likely that the Trade Prac-
tices Amendment (Cartel Conduct) Bill 2005 will be introduced in the first half of 
the year and should have no difficulty passing through Parliament once the Gov-
ernment holds the balance of power in the Senate, as it will from 1 July 2005.  In 
any case, the opposition has indicated that they will support the new laws, consider-
ing them to be long overdue.41
The Government also accepted all of the Dawson Committee’s recommendations 
on civil remedies for cartel conduct
   
 
42 and in 2004, introduced the Trade Practices 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2004 that was to give effect to those recommendations.  
That bill subsequently lapsed as a result of the 2004 federal election.43  However, it 
was recently reintroduced in substantially the same form.44
IV SHOULD CRIMINAL PENALTIES BE AVAILABLE                             
FOR CARTEL CONDUCT?  
  Consequently, it is 
anticipated civil penalties will increase for corporations and the power to exclude 
individuals from company management and to preclude corporations from indemni-
fying individuals will form part of the TPA by May this year. 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the Government’s proposals, it is appropriate to 
first address the threshold question of whether criminal penalties should be avail-
able for cartel conduct.  The key justifications advanced for the introduction of 
criminal penalties for cartel conduct are that  
 
• they would provide a valuable and more effective deterrent to engaging in 
the conduct than the civil remedies currently available; 
                                                          
40  Michael Rowland, Business Council wary of new laws cracking down on cartel activity (Feb. 2, 2005) 
available at ABC online – PM: <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2005/s1294604.htm>.   Note, while 
the government has not publicly indicated a timeframe this appears a reasonable estimate.  By contrast 
Leora Moldofsky has claimed the ‘government plans to introduce the proposed laws into parliament by 
the end of March’, which is too soon given the necessary consultation process:  Australian regulator gets 
tougher on price fixing (Feb. 2 2005) accessed at FT.com.  Consultation with the states commenced on 2 
February 2005.  The legislation will be introduced via the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct) 
Bill 2005.  This bill was still being drafted in March 2005.  At the conclusion of drafting approval from 
the states is required over a 35 day voting period: see, Treasurer and Minister for Small Business and 
Tourism, supra note 2.   
41 Doorstop Interview with Wayne Swan MP, Shadow Treasurer, Australia, Labor welcomes these long 
overdue proposals from the Treasurer to curb cartel behaviour at Treasury Place, Melbourne (Feb. 2 
2005).  See also, Rowland, supra note 40. 
42  Commonwealth of Australia, Response to the Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, supra note 37, at 10..  
43  The bill lapsed on 31 August 2004 after it had passed through the House of Representatives without 
amendment and had been introduced and had its second reading in the Senate, on 5 August 2004. 
44  See , supra note 8. 
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• their introduction would ensure fairness and consistency with other forms 
of economic crime, such as insider trading, tax evasion and more common 
forms of theft; and  
• it would be consistent with developing international best practice.45
 
A  Deterrence 
   
The key justification advanced by the ACCC in calling for criminal sanctions, the 
Dawson Committee in recommending their introduction and by the Government in 
their proposal to introduce them, is that criminal penalties will provide a more 
effective deterrent than the existing civil penalties.46  In this respect the OECD has 
also suggested that the ‘principal purpose of sanctions in cartel cases is deterrence’ 
and that ‘sanctions against individuals can provide important, additional deter-
rence’.47
The two recognised forms of deterrence in criminal jurisprudence are specific 
deterrence and general deterrence.  The former is punitive in nature and seeks to 
discourage crime in an endeavour to convince offenders not to re-offend.
   
 
48  General 
deterrence, on the other hand, seeks to dissuade potential offenders by making clear 
there will be severe consequences if caught offending.  It is general deterrence that 
provides the chief argument for criminalising cartel conduct; that is, criminal penal-
ties will provide a more effective deterrent than civil penalties for first time offend-
ers.  While evidence suggests that in most cases the seriousness of the penalty does 
little to increase deterrence,49
                                                          
45  See further Julie Clarke and Mirko Bagaric, The Desirability of Criminal Penalties for Breaches of 
Part IV of the Trade Practices Act, 31 AUSTRALIAN B. L. REV. 192-209 (2003). 
46  ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, supra note 22, at 35.  See also Dawson Report, 
supra note 31, at 153, 163.  Deterrence also seems to be at the heart of the current civil regime: ‘The 
principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to put a price on 
contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravener and by others who might be 
tempted to contravene the Act’: Justice French in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, ATPR 41-076 
at 52,152 [1991], quoted in Corones, supra note 20.   
47 OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 3. 
48  In relation to specific deterrence, most evidence supports the view that criminal penalties, including 
incarceration, do not provide effective specific deterrence; that is, punishment, once received, will not 
necessarily deter a person from re-offending.  It is, therefore, unlikely that harsher penalties will affect 
the rate of recidivity in this area. See The Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, 
Incapacitation, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, 66 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen and 
Daniel Nagin eds, 1978) and Mirko Bagaric, Incapacitation, Deterrence and Rehabilitation: Flawed 
Ideals or Appropriate Sentencing Goals 24 CRIMINAL L.J. 19, 35-5 (2000). 
49  In other words, the evidence suggests that generally there is no direct correlation between severity of 
the sanction and prevalence of the offence.  See further Clarke & Bagaric, supra note 45, at 192-209. It 
appears that most offenders commit crimes in response to situational factors such as opportunities and 
transient motives. Where this is so, there is no firm evidence that increasing penalty levels result in a 
reduction in crime. See: FRANK E. ZIMRING AND GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL 
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 29 (1973), NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60-61, 
191 (1969), ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD WIDE PERSPECTIVE ch 6 (1996) and 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH AND ANTHONY BOTTOMS, CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY 47-
48 (1999). 
 white collar crime appears to be an exception to this 
rule.  That is, to the extent that a correlation between severity of punishment and the 
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level of criminal conduct exists, it is in the context of offences – such as white 
collar offences – where the offender has the time, inclination and resources to do a 
cost-benefit analysis.50
In these cases, for a penalty to provide an effective deterrent the expected gain from 
the contravention must exceed the gain from the violation.
  
 
51 The current penalty 
regime in Australia, combined with the small risk of detection, does not meet this 
requirement:52
The fact that the same companies and one individual involved in price-
fixing in ACCC v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd had engaged in the same 
conduct before suggests that pecuniary penalties alone are not having a de-
terrent effect.
 
 
53
                                                          
50  Recently, the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce took the view that ‘the arguments are relatively 
strong for assuming a high degree of rationality when firms make decisions about whether to comply 
with a competition law’: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE (NZ), PENALTIES, REMEDIES AND COURT PROCESSES 
UNDER THE COMMERCE ACT 1985: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 7 (1998).   See also McNeill, supra note 
11:   ‘Although there are many moral people in business … some businesses and business people need an 
external incentive to comply with the law – a risk benefit analysis that weights heavily against involve-
ment in unlawful cartels’. 
51  Wouter P.J. Wils, Does the effective enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC require not only fines on 
undertakings but also individual penalties, in particular imprisonment, Paper presented at the EU Com-
petition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, European University Institute 11 (2001). See also Stuart 
M. Chemtob, Antitrust Deterrence in the United States and Japan, Paper presented at a Conference on 
Competition Policy in the Global Trading System: Perspectives from Japan, the United States, and the 
European Union, Washington DC 3 (June 23, 2000), available at 
< http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/5076.pdf>.  
52  The increased penalties provided for in the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005 
will come closer to approximating optimal penalties for price fixing but will still not be sufficient to 
constitute an effective deterrent.  
53  Corones, supra note 20, at 164: ‘ … The message that needs to be conveyed is that from an individual 
manager’s point of view, price-fixing and collusive tendering do not pay. They cost. And the cost is so 
high that the conduct is not worth contemplating.’ See also Energex, supra note 7, at 6, Round, supra 
note 7, at 123 (‘The fact that [price-fixing] is still quite common [in Australia] suggests that to a rational 
price-fixer the expected gains from colluding on prices with rivals exceed the expected costs of being 
detected, prosecuted and found in breach of the Act’) and Robert Baxt, Thinking about Regulatory Mix – 
Companies and Securities, Tax and Trade Practices, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND AUSTRALIA’S 
FUTURE 124-127 (Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite eds, 1993). Compare  BP, Submission to the 
Review of the Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 47, Trade Practices Act 
Review, 5 (2002) (‘…current penalties provide sufficient deterrence’); Shell Australia, Submission to the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 14, Trade Practices Act 
Review, 1, 7-8 (2002) (‘… there would be very few corporations or individuals where the prospect of a 
penalty [the size of the current maximum] would not act as an adequate deterrent’); Vodafone, Submis-
sion to the Trade Practices Act Review, Public Submission 60, Trade Practices Act Review, 6 (2002) 
(‘Financial penalties against both the individual and the company are sufficient deterrents against anti-
competitive actions’); Business Council of Australia, Submission to the Dawson Review of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 and Its Administration, Public Submission 71, Trade Practices Act Review, 117 
(2002) (‘the severe penalties which currently apply for those offences are an adequate deterrence’) and 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ACCI Submission to the Dawson Committee Review of 
the Trade Practices Act, Public Submission 104, Trade Practices Act Review, 85-88 (2002).  
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The OECD has also observed that the maximum fines found in the laws of many 
countries dealing with cartel conduct ‘may not be sufficiently large’54 and that 
‘available data indicate that larger sanctions are required to achieve effective deter-
rence.’ 55
In relation to corporations it is unlikely that any financial penalty alone – even the 
vastly increased pecuniary penalties planned by the Government - could provide an 
effective deterrent because, to do so, it would need to be so high as to be impossible 
in practice.
  
 
56 Roughly, given the difficulty of detection and the expected gains from 
cartel conduct over the average duration of an undetected cartel, it has been esti-
mated that the figure required to provide effective deterrence on a cost-benefit 
analysis would be unreasonably high,57 in many cases exceeding the corporation’s 
ability to pay.  The result of this would be to reduce deterrence value,58 remove a 
competitor from the market and penalise the wrong people; namely shareholders, 
creditors and, ultimately, consumers.59
As realistic financial penalties for corporations alone are not sufficient to provide 
effective deterrence against cartelisation, the question then becomes, what level of 
penalty is required in order for individuals to consider the cost of becoming in-
volved in unlawful cartels so high as to make it not worthwhile?  Again, the current 
civil pecuniary penalties are clearly insufficient and higher civil penalties, while 
possibly providing some additional deterrence, could not, within a reasonable 
range, provide an effective deterrent for several reasons.  First, as is the case for 
corporations, the individual may be ‘judgement-proof’ – unable to ‘pay the mini-
 
 
                                                          
54  OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 4.  That is, 
they may not be large enough ‘to accommodate multiples of the gain to the cartel, as recommended by 
many experts’ 
55  Id. at 5, 16. 
56  Wils, supra not 51, at 11-12:  ‘The expected fine is that imposed if the violation is detected and 
punished, multiplied by the probability of detection and punishment. The gain, which the firm obtains 
from the violation, divided by the probability of being fined, thus constitutes a floor below which fines 
will generally not deter.’ [footnotes omitted]. 
57 ‘Assuming a 10% price increase, and a resulting increase in profits of 5% of turnover, a 5-year dura-
tion and a 16% probability of detection and punishment, the floor below which fines will generally not 
deter price-fixing would be in the order of 150% of the annual turnover in the products concerned by the 
violations.’ [footnotes omitted]: Wils, supra not 51, at 13.  For further detailed discussion of optimal 
penalties for competition law contraventions see MINISTRY OF COMMERCE (NZ), supra note 50, at 8-11.   
See also Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 160-161. 
58 It has been observed that if, between 1955 and 1993, optimal fines had been imposed on firms con-
victed of price-fixing ‘58% of the firms would not have been able to survive … without becoming 
technically insolvent’: Wils, supra not 51, at 15, citing C. Craycraft, J.L Craycraft JL and J.C. Gallo, 
Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s Ability to Pay, 12 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORG. 171. See also Stephen 
Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal Penalties, 60 LAW AND CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 127, 143 (1997) (‘… were the numbers raised sufficiently high, the great majority of individual 
defendants would be unable to pay’). 
59  For further discussion see Wils, supra not 51, at 16, 18, ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act 
Review, supra note 22, at 34, Gerald Acquaah-Gaisie, Corporate crimes: Criminal intent and just 
restitution, 13 AUSTRALIAN J. OF CORP. L. 219 (2001) and OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND 
IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 16.  
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mum financial penalty required for effective deterrence’.60 Second, even if an 
individual is able to pay the fine imposed, there is an additional problem of indem-
nification – it is relatively easy for the corporation to indemnify, at least indirectly, 
an executive or employee that has been financially penalised for anti-competitive 
conduct.61 In addition, most executives who have admitted or have been held to 
have engaged in cartel conduct have also managed to retain their existing employ-
ment or find other equivalent, or more rewarding, employment elsewhere.62  Fi-
nally, the potential gains of cartelising, given the low detection rate, might still 
appear too enticing for certain individuals.  In this respect, even the Business Coun-
cil of Australia (BCA) has accepted that at present under the current system ‘there 
is a danger that [conspirators] may think the profits from price-fixing are going to 
outweigh any fines’.63
Because financial penalties alone are not capable of providing an effective deterrent 
against engaging in cartel conduct, alternative penalties need to be considered. One 
possibility is imprisonment.
 
 
64
A conventional risk-benefit analysis breaks down when the possibility of impris-
onment or other criminal sanctions are introduced. It is difficult to impose a dollar 
amount on the loss of freedom or the stigma
 
 
65
                                                          
60  See Wils, supra not 51, at 10.  See also Arie Freiberg, Monetary Penalties Under the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth), 11 AUSTRALIAN B.L.REV. 4, 16-18 (1983) discussing the capacity of an individual 
defendant to pay penalties under the trade practices and the consequences of inability to pay. 
61  While the Dawson Committee has recommended that legislation be amended to prohibit corporations 
from ‘indemnifying, directly or indirectly, officers, employees or agents against the imposition of a 
pecuniary penalty upon an officer, employee or agent’ (Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 165 rec 
10.2.3), Wils notes that such prohibitions may easily be avoided: ‘… firms can relatively easily indem-
nify their agents for any threat of fines or any fines effectively imposed, thus taking away the deterrent 
effect of the penalty on the individuals concerned … the firm can relatively easily compensate the 
manager in advance for taking the risk and/or indemnify him ex post when he has to pay the fine’ (Wils, 
supra not 51, at 27). 
62  The Dawson Committee has recommended that Courts be given the option of excluding individuals 
found guilty of hard core cartel conduct from being a director of a corporation or being involved in its 
management (Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 165 rec 10.2.2).  This recommendation now forms part 
of the current Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005.  This may reduce the ease with 
which individuals may obtain future similar employment, however it is unlikely to cover all avenues of 
involvement in business activity. 
63 Blair Speedy, Industry worried by cartel penalties, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 3, 2005 (online) at 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,12127457,00.html> (quoting Steven 
Munchenberg, Business Council of Australia general manager of government and regulatory affairs). 
64  See, e.g., Wils, supra not 51, at 27 (‘… there is ample evidence that the threat of imprisonment 
constitutes a very effective deterrent for antitrust offences’).  
65  A distinguishing feature of the criminal law is that it ‘carries, and is designed to carry, a stigma 
effect’: Wils, supra not 51, at 33. See also Small Business Development Corporation, Submission to the 
Trade Practices Act Review, Public Submission 84, Trade Practices Act Review, 2 (2002) (‘The social 
and commercial stigma attaching to imprisonment for breaching the law can be significant’) and Gerard 
Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 
23, 39-40 (1997).  The Dawson Report also noted the moral condemnation associated with criminal 
punishment: ‘A criminal conviction represents the condemnation of society in a way that the imposition 
of a civil penalty cannot …’ (Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 158). 
 associated with serving time in 
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prison or receiving a criminal conviction.66 In the case of senior businessmen, the 
threat of imprisonment is likely to prove particularly potent.67 It is, therefore, likely 
that the threat of criminal sanction, in the form of a fine and/or prison term are more 
likely to prove a more effective deterrent against cartel conduct than any amount of 
pecuniary penalty.  Even the BCA, who have expressed reservations at the introduc-
tion of criminal penalties,68 have conceded that ‘the prospect of going to jail is 
going to make individuals think a lot harder about whether they engage in illegal 
activity.’69
Another key justification for introducing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct is 
fairness and consistency.
   
 
B Fairness and consistency 
70  The law presently criminalizes similar types of conduct 
– much of which is less harmful to society – and therefore cartel conduct should not 
be exempt from criminal prosecution.  While this argument is not without flaws,71 it 
is inherently difficulty to justify criminalising, for example, common theft, which 
may cost an individual victim a few hundred or even thousand dollars, while leav-
ing cartel conduct, which produces multiple victims suffering combined losses 
often into the millions of dollars, immune from criminal sanction.  Most notably 
cartels lead to consumers paying more for goods and services and, in this way, 
unfairly deprives consumers of property – in the form of money.72 Conservative 
estimates put the harm of cartels in excess of many billions of US dollars annu-
ally.73
                                                          
66  See Chemtob, supra note 51, at 19 (‘… criminal enforcement has the potential to improve deterrence 
markedly by introducing non-monetary costs into the equation …’). Compare Australian Industry Group, 
Submission to Committee of Enquiry into the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
and their Administration, Public Submission 109, Trade Practices Act Review, 61 (2002) (‘it is still 
unsound logic …  to suggest that imprisonment of individual executives or managers engaged in the 
cartel activity for the corporation will act as a more effective deterrent to other corporations or individu-
als’). 
67  See Arthur Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 630-631 (1977) quoted in 
Wils, supra not 51, at 28. See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 
2416 (1997) who notes that ‘the threat of jail has different meanings for different people. … For users of 
moderate wealth, the threat of jail may provide more of a deterrent than the monetary cost.’ 
68  See Speedy, supra note 63 and, in relation to corporate fines, Toni O’Loughlin, Costello backs jail 
sentences for executives, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Feb. 2, 2005, at 1, 4.  
69  Rowland, supra note 40, quoting Business Council of Australia’s General Manager of Government 
and Regulatory Affairs, Stephen Muchenburg.  Overseas experience also suggests that the imposition of 
criminal penalties, particularly in combination with a leniency policy, helps to promote both deterrence 
and detection of cartels.  
70  See Clarke & Bagaric, supra note 45 for a more detailed discussion of the possible justifications for 
introducing criminal penalties for this type of conduct. 
71  See Clarke & Bagaric, supra note 45, at 200-202. 
72  See also Acquaah-Gaisie, supra note 59 (‘Conventional crime may touch only a few people, but 
corporate crimes can devastate many lives. …). 
73 OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 2.  See also 
OECD, FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS: HARM, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND LENIENCY PROGRAMMES 
81 (2002): ‘It remains difficult to place a monetary value on the harm [caused by cartels], but it is surely 
significant, amounting to billions of dollars annually’ and, (at 72) ‘the amount of commerce affected by 
just 16 large cartel cases reported in the OECD survey exceeded USD 55 billion world-wide. … it is 
clear that the magnitude of harm from cartels is many billions of dollars annually.’ 
   In this respect it has often been observed that 
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Hard-core collusion is morally reprehensible. It is a form of theft and little 
different from other white collar crimes (including insider trading and ob-
taining a benefit by deception) that already attract criminal sentences.74
It is not unusual for anti-competitive violations to involve far greater sums 
than those that may be taken by thieves or fraudsters, and the violations 
can have a far greater impact upon the welfare of society. …
 
 
75
The Government takes a similar stance with the Treasurer describing hard-
core cartels as ‘a very sophisticated way of essentially stealing.
 
 
76
Other forms of white collar crime can and do result in criminal penalties.  Even 
within the TPA itself, conduct such as false or misleading representations,
 
 
77 bait 
advertising,78 referral selling79 and pyramid selling80 carry potential criminal penal-
ties.  This different treatment, despite the fact that cartels are clearly ‘capable of 
doing far more damage to our economy and to consumers than many of the worst 
consumer scams’,81
Criminalisation of cartel conduct would, therefore, go someway to addressing 
claims that the current criminal law regime benefits those capable of more complex 
and sophisticated theft or fraud by treating their conduct as forgivable by way of 
civil pecuniary penalties while other less sophisticated (and less financially devas-
 is anomalous and unjustified. 
 
                                                          
74  ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, supra note 22, at 24.  
75  ACCC v. ABB Transmission and Distribution Limited (No. 2) FCA 559, ¶28 [2002] per Justice 
Finkelstein, cited in ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review, Public Submission 50, Trade 
Practices Act Review, 25 (2002).  The quote continues: ‘Cartels … enrich participants at the expense of 
consumers. They injure consumers by raising prices above the competitive level and reducing output. 
Cartels can be very harmful across wide areas of an economy by artificially creating market power and 
leads to inefficient and wasteful allocation of resources … They are blatant frauds on consumers’.  See 
also Corones, supra note 20 and OECD, FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 73, at 71-81. 
76  ABC Television, Tougher penalties for price-fixing business cartels (Feb. 2, 2005) available at ABC 
online - The 7:30 Report: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1294813.htm.  See also Corones, 
supra note 20, at 160: ‘The objections to [price-fixing and collusive tendering] are both economic and 
ethical. At the economic level, price-fixing and collusive tendering entail a loss of economic efficiency 
and a financial burden on the purchaser, ultimately the consumer or taxpayer. Ethically, they involve 
deception for financial gain.’ 
77  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 75AZC (Cth). 
78  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 75AZJ (Cth). 
79  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 75AZK (Cth). 
80  Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 75AZO (Cth). These activities are criminalized despite the apparent 
recognition (through the size of penalty available) that, financially at least, they are less harmful to 
society than contraventions of Part IV. The current maximum criminal penalty for breaches of these 
sections is 10,000 penalty units in each case (equivalent to $1.1 million), significantly less than the 
maximum civil penalty available for breaches of Part IV. 
81  McNeill, supra note 11.  Graeme Samuel has also described cartels as ‘a cancer on the economy, a 
silent extortion’ and ‘amongst our highest priorities’: Graeme Samuel, Future work of the ICN: Introduc-
tion to the 6th International Cartels Workshop, Speech delivered at the 3rd International Competition 
Network Annual Conference, Seoul (April 22, 2004), available at 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/500257/fromItemId/8973>.    
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tating) criminals may find themselves behind bars or at least facing criminal convic-
tion and its associated stigma.82
The final key justification advanced is that criminalising cartel conduct would bring 
Australia into line with best practices in cartel enforcement around the world.
   
 
Criminalisation would also bring hard-core cartelisation in line with other compara-
ble (or even less harmful) white collar crimes and would also recognise it as at least 
as morally reprehensible as other forms of financial crime. 
C International best practice 
83 
Some of the most successful cartel regulators employ criminal penalties, frequently 
in combination with leniency programs, as an effective mechanism in deterring and 
identifying cartel conduct.  Many of these regimes also employ concurrent civil 
remedies, as is proposed for Australia.  The United States, for example, has crimi-
nalised cartel conduct since the enactment of the Sherman Act of 1890 and has 
recently introduced tougher criminal penalties via the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 which increases the maximum corporate fine 
from $10m to $100m, the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1m and the 
maximum prison term from 3 years to 10 years.84
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has only recently introduced criminal 
penalties for cartel conduct
  
 
85
                                                          
82  See, e.g., Wils, supra not 51, at 28: (‘… imprisonment, being society’s most onerous and stigmatic 
punishment, should not be withheld from those with economic power and social status, when it is 
regularly applied to the poor and powerless …’); Australian Consumers Association, Submission on the 
Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Public Submission 105, Trade 
Practices Act Review, 7 (2002) (‘In the interests of equality of justice, there is no reason that corporate 
criminals engaged in cartel behaviour, which is a form of theft, should be immune from a jail sentence 
which is faced by other thieves’) and Lynch, supra note 65, at 39-40. 
83  See Fels, The Trades Practices Act and world's best practice, supra note 1: ‘The Australian law needs 
to remain in step with the law applying in many of its major trading partners’. 
84  See further Scott D. Hammond, An Overview of Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division’s 
Criminal Enforcement Program, Speech to the American Bar Association, Kona, Hawaii, (Jan. 10 2005), 
available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf>.  The new Act passed into law on 
23 June 2004.  However, even prior to its enactment, in the case of both individuals and corporations, the 
fine was capable of being increased to the higher of either twice the pecuniary gain enjoyed by the 
defendant or twice the gross loss to victims of the conduct: see ACCC, Submission to the Trade Prac-
tices Act Review, supra note 22, at 57.  This facilitated very large fines for antitrust breaches, including a 
fine of $500 million against F. Hoffmann-La Roche for it’s role in the international vitamin cartel (this 
was ‘the largest single fine imposed in a DOJ case for any crime under any statute’: Scott D. Hammond, 
From Hollywood to Hong Kong - Criminal Antitrust Enforcement is Coming to a City Near You, Paper 
presented at the Antitrust Beyond Borders Conference, Chicogo, Illinous 3 (Nov. 9, 2001)).  See also 
Press Release, Department of Justice (US), F Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF Agree to Pay Record 
Criminal Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999), available at 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm>.  In relation to individual penalties, fines of up to 
$7.5 million have been awarded, in addition to jail time: Dan Ackman, Taubman Sentenced To One Year 
– Plus A Day, FORBES, NEW YORK, April 22, 2002, at 
<http://www.forbes.com/2002/04/22/0422taubman.html>. 
85  Enterprise Act, 2002, (UK). 
 which, for individuals, could result in an unlimited 
criminal fine and/or up to 5 years imprisonment.  A defendant can be convicted if, 
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targeting the United Kingdom, ‘he “dishonestly” agrees with one or more persons 
to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented’,86
• Directly or indirectly fix the price of goods or services; 
 a horizontal 
agreement to: 
 
• Limit or prevent supply or production of goods or supply of services; 
• Allocate customers or markets; or 
• Rig contract bids.87
 
This criminal offence is separate to the civil prohibition and does not depend upon a 
breach of the existing civil laws.  Corporations are not subjected to criminal prose-
cution. It is too soon to gauge the full effectiveness of this new regime as a deter-
rent against cartel conduct. 
 
 
A number of other countries, including Canada, France, Ireland and Japan also 
provide for criminal fines and jail terms for cartel conduct and others are consider-
ing their introduction.88
V THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSAL: THE CARTEL OFFENCE 
 
 
These three key justifications all appropriately favour the introduction of criminal 
penalties.  Consequently, the following evaluation of the Government’s proposals 
will focus on how these penalties are being introduced and will assume the thresh-
old issue of whether any criminal sanctions are appropriate for cartel conduct can 
be answered in the affirmative. 
 
The Government’s proposal for the criminalisation of cartels will  
 
prohibit a person from making or giving effect to a contract, arrangement 
or understanding between competitors that contains a provision to fix 
prices, restrict output, divide markets or rig bids, where the contract, ar-
rangement or understanding is made or given effect to with the intention of 
dishonestly obtaining a gain from customers who fall victim to the cartel.89
The civil system of cartel prohibition will also be significantly changed.  It is un-
clear yet precisely how the existing provisions dealing with cartel conduct will 
alter, but the Government has indicated that ‘revised civil per se prohibitions for 
cartel behaviour will reflect the OECD recommendations, so that this separately 
 
 
                                                          
86  Enterprise Act, 2002, § 188(1) (UK). 
87  Enterprise Act, 2002, § 188(1) (UK). 
88  See, e.g. Competition Act (Canada) (imprisonment of up to 5 years available), Competition Act, 2002 
(Ireland) (imprisonment of up to 5 years available) and the Antimonopoly Law, 1947 (Japan) (impris-
onment of up to 5 years available).  Note, however, that to date jail time has only been imposed in the 
United States and Canada. 
89  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
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addresses cartel activity’ with the intent that this will provide a more effective civil 
system and will ensure ‘consistency in the way in which the revised civil prohibi-
tions and the new criminal offence are applied.’ 
 
The Government intends criminal prosecution to be restricted to ‘serious’ cartel 
conduct to be, with what the Government refers to as more ‘minor’ cartel conduct 
being dealt with through the civil system.  To this end the Government has indi-
cated that the DPP and ACCC are to enter into a public Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) ‘establishing procedures for the investigation of the cartel offence 
and the circumstances in which the ACCC will refer a case to the DPP’.90
the value of affected commerce exceeded $1 million within a 12 month pe-
riod, that is, where the combined value for all cartel participants of the 
specific line of commerce effected by the cartel exceeds $1 million within 
a 12 month period.  For bid rigging cases, the value of the successful bid or 
series of bids would need to exceed $1 million within a 12 month period.
   
 
For the ACCC, relevant factors for determining whether to refer the matter to the 
DPP for prosecution will include the ‘impact of the cartel and the scale of detriment 
caused to consumers and the public, and previous admissions to or convictions for 
cartel conduct’.  It will also include controversial thresholds, with the ACCC to 
consider whether  
 
91
the impact of the cartel on the market, the scale of the detriment caused to 
consumers or the public, and whether any of the alleged members of the 
cartel have previously been found by a criminal or civil court, or admitted, 
to having engaged in cartel behaviour.
  
 
Once referred, the MOU would further require the DPP to consider, before deciding 
whether to prosecute,  
 
92
The ACCC will also be required to issue separate Guidelines indicating when they 
will proceed with criminal investigation which are to be consistent with the MOU.
 
 
93
The Government has also indicated that appropriate whisleblower protection, 
through an immunity program, is to be made available to assist in uncovering 
cartels, with guidelines to be formulated to determine when such immunity would 
 
 
As a consequence of these proposed guidelines, criminal prosecution for contraven-
tions of the cartel offence, while prima facie applying to all business, regardless of 
size, or the amount of commerce affected, will, in practice, be restricted to larger 
businesses where a significant volume of commerce has been affected.   
 
                                                          
90  Id.. 
91  Id.. 
92  Id.. 
93  Id.. 
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be granted.  This would also involve amendment of the DPP’s Prosecution Policy 
to ‘enable immunity to be granted at an early stage in an investigation’.94
VI EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL  
 
 
Finally, the Government has made clear that conduct currently permitted under the 
TPA through a series of exemptions or through the authorisation process will also 
be exempt from criminal prosecution. 
 
There are a number of aspects of the Government’s recommendations which require 
further evaluation.  In particular, this section will address the Government’s defini-
tion of cartel, the dishonesty element, the proposal to limit prosecution to ‘serious’ 
breaches of the cartel offence, the level of penalty, exclusions from prohibitions, the 
management of concurrent civil and criminal penalties, the roles of the ACCC and 
DPP and the whistleblower protection plan. 
 
A Definition of cartel conduct and placement in the TPA 
Leaving aside the issue of dishonesty, which will be discussed further below, the 
Government indicated it wished to ‘proscribe serious cartel conduct in a manner 
consistent with international best practice’95 which it considered could be achieved 
by a adopting the OECD’s definition of ‘hard-core cartel’.96
                                                          
94  Id.. 
95  Id.. 
96  A similar approach was taken in the United Kingdom where the Report which ultimately led to the 
introduction of criminal sanctions recommended that ‘hard-core’ cartels be defined by the type of 
conduct involved, namely, price fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging and agreements to restrict output or 
set quotas, subject to that conduct that already benefits from specific exemptions.  The Report further 
concluded that it was preferable to incorporate a concept of ‘dishonesty’ in entering into agreements, 
rather than to seek to rely on economic elements, such as lessening of competition, for purpose of 
determining the seriousness or otherwise of the conduct: ANTHONY HAMMOND AND ROY PENROSE, 
PROPOSED CRIMINALISATION OF CARTELS IN THE UK, 4, 9 (Office of Fair Trading, November 2001).  
  The OECD Recom-
mendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels defines a ‘hard 
core cartel’ as: 
 
an anticompetitive agreement, anti-competitive concerted practice, or anti-
competitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids 
(collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or di-
vide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of 
commerce [but does not include] agreements, concerted practices or ar-
rangements that  
 
i) are reasonably related to the lawful realisation of cost-reducing or out-
put-enhancing efficiencies,  
ii) are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a Member 
country’s own laws, or  
 18   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 1 
 
iii) are authorised in accordance with those laws.97
• an agreement is made between or given effect to by two or more parties; 
 
 
The nature of the conduct as ‘hard core’ is, therefore, determined solely by the type 
of cartel involved and does not involve any consideration of the size of the cartel or 
its participants.  In accordance with this recommendation, the Government has 
proposed that the new cartel offence and amended civil per se provisions capture 
price fixing, output restrictions, bid rigging and market sharing.  In particular, it 
would involve proof of the following: 
 
• the parties who made the agreement are competitors in the supply or ac-
quisition of goods or services in a particular market; and 
• the agreement contains a provision to fix prices, restrict output, share or 
divide markets or rig bids.98
 
   
The Government notes that the four forms of conduct referred to will be ‘explicitly 
defined’ in the offence, though no details have yet been provided.  An additional 
dishonesty element, to be discussed below, will be incorporated into the criminal 
offence but not the new civil prohibition on cartel conduct.99
                                                          
97  OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE 
CARTELS (adopted by the Council at its 921st Session on Mar. 25, 1998), rec. A(2). 
98  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
99  In relation to dishonesty, the Law Council of Australia recommended the following elements be 
present in the cartel offence: ‘a person who dishonestly makes or gives effect to a contract arrangement 
or understanding with one or more other persons which the person and at least one other party to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding intends to have the effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining 
prices for the goods or services, and the person and at least one other person to the contract, arrangement 
or understanding acquire or supply the particular goods or services to persons (other than each other) in 
competition with each other’: Law Council of Australia, Business Law Section, Submission to Working 
Party on Penalties for Cartel Behaviour, 10-11, ¶2.7 (Dec. 12, 2003).  Note that the Law Council 
recommended limiting the offence to price fixing cartels because of fears of inconsistency with the 
operation of the civil per se offence. 
 
 
The types of conduct to be captured are appropriate and consistent with the OECD 
Recommendation and with the prohibited conduct in must other jurisdictions em-
ploying criminal penalties for cartelisation.  The devil, of course, is in the detail, 
and the Government has not yet indicated how these forms of conduct will be 
defined.  As far as possible they should be defined in a manner that would be con-
sistent with existing civil provisions in the TPA.  This would enable reference to an 
existing body of precedent and assist in providing business with some certainty as 
to the forms of conduct to be avoided.  Provided this course is adopted there is 
unlikely to be any real controversy surrounding the definition.   
 
B The dishonesty element  
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The ACCC initially recommended that dishonest intent should not form a necessary 
element of an offence of hard core cartelisation in Australia,100 but subsequently 
supported such a requirement.101
The Government’s proposal does, however, incorporate a dishonesty element into 
the cartel offence, based on the belief that dishonesty is at the ‘heart of serious 
cartel conduct’, involving the deceit of customers who purchase goods or services 
into believing that their price and supply were determined by competition and not 
collusion.
  The Dawson Committee also expressed reserva-
tions about dishonesty element on the grounds that it might cause difficulty for 
jurors. 
 
102
Incorporation of the dishonesty element is also consistent with the approach re-
cently adopted in the United Kingdom and, especially given the proposed uniform 
definition for cartel conduct under the civil regime, provides an appropriate distinc-
tion between conduct that is criminal and that which remains subject to civil penal-
ties alone.
     
 
103
Despite the ACCC and the Dawson Committee’s reservations, it is appropriate to 
incorporate some form of mental element into a criminal offence of this nature and 
dishonesty, having an established definition under the Criminal Code, is unlikely to 
cause jurors too many difficulties.
   
 
104
a jury is satisfied that the cartel arrangement was dishonest according to 
the standards of ordinary people, and the defendant knew it was dishonest 
according to those standards.
  The Criminal Code essentially provides that 
the dishonesty requirement will be proved if: 
 
105
• deception (such as lies or misleading statements),  
   
 
The Government has also listed several indicators of dishonesty, including 
 
• making or relying upon representations or promises that are known to be 
false or which would not be carried out,  
                                                          
100  The main reasoning given by the ACCC for eliminating dishonesty as a requirement is that a ‘busi-
ness is highly unlikely to enter a cartel agreement bona fide’: ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices 
Act Review, supra note 22, at 45.  The Dawson Committee did not make recommendations as to the 
specific requirements of a criminal offence and reached no conclusion about the desirability or otherwise 
of including a dishonesty requirement: Dawson Report, supra note 31, ch 10. 
101  In a subsequent submission the ACCC supported a dishonest requirement: Dawson Report, supra 
note 31, at 155. 
102 Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
103 In this respect the Law Council of Australia submitted that seriousness should be gauged by moral 
culpability and further, that ‘[a] requirement that the person intended to fix prices, or to restrict supply, 
of goods or services appropriately assists in distinguishing criminal from non-criminal arrangements’: 
Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 9-10, ¶2.7. 
104  See also Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2.. (‘dishonesty is an 
established concept in Australian criminal law and is widely used in corporations and fraud offences. … 
appropriately captures the genuinely criminal nature of serious cartel conduct.’) 
105  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
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• concealing facts that there is a duty to disclose, and  
• engaging in conduct that the defendant knows they have no right to engage 
in.106
 
  
It is likely to be very rare that a corporation or individual engaged in cartel conduct 
of the kind proposed to be prohibited will not have known that what they were 
doing was wrong; for competitors entering into cartels dishonesty is normally 
inherent in the conduct itself, which explains the highly secretive nature of car-
tels.107
pecuniary or non-pecuniary gain, either for the defendant or for another 
person.  It must be intended to obtain the gain from a person or class of 
persons likely to acquire or supply the goods or services to which the cartel 
relates.
  Consequently, a basic ‘dishonesty’ requirement is also unlikely to prove a 
large hurdle when seeking to obtain a conviction, provided all other elements of the 
offence are proved. 
 
The Government has, however, gone one step further than merely requiring dishon-
esty.  It has indicated that the dishonesty must relate to the obtaining of a  
 
108
Not only is it unclear how this requirement would be incorporated into the offence 
itself, such a requirement would also complicate what is otherwise a relatively 
straightforward concept with an existing jurisprudence.  If a corporation or individ-
ual engages in conduct that satisfies the other elements of the offence and is dishon-
est in doing so – that is, it is engaged in with the knowledge that it is wrong to do so 
– that should be sufficient.  In particular, it should be of no consequence from 
whom conspirators intend to gain.  This could lead to all manner of arguments 
seeking to justify cartel conduct.  For example, a corporation, or an individual could 
engage in blatant price fixing, knowing what they were doing was wrong, but claim 
that it was done for altruistic purposes, such as ensuring that their business did not 
fail as a result of ‘cut throat’ competition, thereby rendering their workers unem-
ployed.
   
 
109  It is possible to imagine a number of other public benefits that parties to 
a cartel might claim to have intended.110
                                                          
106  Id. 
107  Note that this does not require full knowledge of the offence itself or that would be contrary to the 
notion that ignorance of the law is no excuse.   Thus, knowledge that conduct is ‘wrong’ does not 
necessarily mean knowledge that it is contrary to the criminal law.   
108  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
109 These sorts of arguments have been advanced as justifications for price fixing in Australia and 
elsewhere.  In Australia they currently do not constitute a defence to price fixing but may be argued as a 
public benefit in authorisation proceedings.  See, for example TPC v. Service Station Association Ltd, 44 
FCR 206 (1993) and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 130 (1940). 
110 Many other explanations have been put forth in the past as attempted justifications for price-fixing, 
most with little success.  They include public safety (see National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States, 435 US 679 (1978)), the need to create countervailing power to that of suppliers or 
customers (see Re Australian Phosphate Purchasing Association 1 TPR 397 (1982)) and the need to fund 
research and development and/or improve quality (see Re The Yarn Spinners’ Agreement 1 All ER 299 
[1959]).  See further PHILIP CLARKE AND STEPHEN CORONES, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 292-283 (1999). 
  How is a court – or, in particular, a jury – 
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to assess these?  What level of intent must there be?  Is it sufficient if an individual 
did not intend consumers to be out of pocket, but knew this would be an unfortunate 
but inevitable consequence of the conduct?  Is it sufficient if the accused knew that 
they would obtain an immediate pecuniary gain, but did not have this as a long term 
goal?  Is it the immediate or long term objective that is to be assessed?   
 
Questions such as long-term/short-term intent have arisen from time to time within 
the existing competition law provisions and have generally caused problems and 
confusion, even in experienced federal courts; the potential for causing jurors 
confusion is very evident.  For potential offenders it also unnecessarily blurs the 
lines between what is, and what is not, acceptable conduct.  
 
The additional dishonesty elements are not necessary to confirm with OECD rec-
ommendations or with international best practice and simply complicate an issue, 
particularly one to be put before a jury, when there is nothing obvious to be gained.  
The Government should omit any such requirement beyond simple ‘dishonesty’ 
from the bill giving effect to these reforms and it should not appear in any of the 
proposed guidelines. 
 
C Only serious breaches criminal? 
The suggestion that only ‘serious cartel conduct’ be targeted for criminal prosecu-
tion has, not surprisingly, caused considerable controversy.  The Dawson Commit-
tee flagged early on that there were ‘undeniable difficulties in defining a criminal 
offence which covers only serious cartel behaviour.’111  In particular, the issue of 
whether or not small business should be exempt from criminal provisions was 
debated in depth at the time of the Dawson Review, with the ACCC first submitting 
that only big business should be targeted but then changing their mind, recognising 
such distinction to be unacceptable.112  The Dawson Committee did not attempt to 
define the range of conduct that should be criminalised but did, sensibly, recom-
mend that ‘any criminal sanctions that are created should apply to all who engage in 
the cartel conduct and not just to large corporations’.113  The Law Council of Aus-
tralia, in its submission to the Working Party, also dismiss duration,114 substantial-
ity of the market115 and commerce affected,116 as measures of seriousness, instead 
focussing on moral culpability as the appropriate criteria.117
While the Government has followed these recommendations in relation to the 
proposed legislation itself, it has undermined them by proposing that the MOU 
 
 
                                                          
111 Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 154. 
112 Id. at 154. 
113 Id. at 163. 
114  Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 8, ¶2.4.2 (on the basis it 
would be too arbitrary). 
115 Id. at 8, ¶2.4.3 (on the basis it would be too uncertain in its application). 
116 Id. at 8, ¶2.4.4 (on the basis it may not take into account the ‘multiplier effect of a cartel affecting 
supply of an essential ingredient or component on very substantial downstream markets.’) 
117 Id. at 9, ¶2.4.5.   
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between the DPP and ACCC and the additional ACCC guidelines on the cartel 
offence, limit the circumstances in which criminal action would be pursued to 
conduct where a significant amount of commerce was affected, thus ruling out some 
smaller business agreements which would otherwise fall within the legislation.   
 
In particular, the Government has announced that the MOU will require the ACCC 
to consider, before referring a matter to the DPP for prosecution, whether: 
 
• the alleged conduct was longstanding or had, or could have, a significant 
impact on the market in which the conduct occurred; or 
• the alleged conduct caused, or could cause, significant detriment to the 
public, or a class thereof, or caused or could cause, significant loss or 
damage to one or more customers of the alleged participants …118
 
 
In addition, the MOU will include monetary thresholds, outlined above, to assist the 
ACCC in determining what would constitute a ‘significant impact on the market’ or 
‘significant detriment to the public’.119
This is all designed, according to the Government, to enable ‘proportionate re-
sponse’ with the ‘most serious cartel conduct’ being ‘pursued under the criminal 
provisions, and other cartel conduct would be litigated civilly.’
 
 
Similarly, even when the ACCC does refer a matter to the DPP, the MOU will 
impose a separate requirement on the DPP to consider ‘the impact of the cartel on 
the market’ and ‘the scale of the detriment caused to consumers or the public’ in 
deciding whether or not to prosecute a cartel offence. 
 
120  As a conse-
quence, while technically the criminal provisions will apply to all business – big or 
small – the Government has indirectly imposed a limitation on the application of 
the offence to only ‘serious cartel conduct that causes large scale or significant 
economic harm’;121
                                                          
118  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
119 These thresholds are set out, above. 
120  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
121  Id.  The Treasurer also notes that in the enforcement of the offence ‘we actually look at the big 
operators’ because they have the ability to distort markets: ABC Television, Tougher penalties, supra 
note 76. 
 thus, it is not all serious cartel conduct that will be pursued, but 
rather, only the most serious of the serious.   
 
This distinction based on size or scale unjustified.  First, cartel conduct captured by 
the cartel offence is already ‘serious’, by definition, and the proportionate response 
to criminal conduct is to apply a criminal penalty.  The level of harm caused by the 
illegal conduct is more appropriately a matter for sentencing (as is the case with 
most criminal offences that can cause varying degrees of harm) and not for deter-
mining whether to pursue criminal prosecution in the first place.  For example, 
individuals guilty of speeding are subject to (at least) criminal fines regardless of 
whether or not they were exceeding the speed limit by 10km or 100km; the fine is 
simply greater, the higher the speedometer reading. 
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The distinction also presumes that the more value of commerce affected the more 
damage incurred; in fact smaller cartels may have profound impact in, for example, 
smaller country towns where more harm may be caused to certain individual con-
sumers in that town, compared to larger cartels that might inflict more total net 
damage, but that damage is diffused amongst a wider group of consumers or com-
petitors.  Thus, simply because the amount of commerce affected by price fixing 
may be small does not render the offence less serious for the purpose of defining 
what is to be criminal; all of these forms of conduct are serious.122
Second, the distinction is not needed in order to be consistent with international best 
practice; the OECD recommendations which simply define hard core – or serious - 
cartel conduct by the type of conduct involved and nothing more.
 
 
123  Even the Law 
Council of Australia, which has claimed, controversially, that ‘not all price fixing or 
market sharing agreements could be classed as ‘serious cartel conduct’,124 neverthe-
less agrees that it is not suitable to define serious by the size of the business.125
Finally, the issue of fairness naturally arises when financial thresholds are intro-
duced.  It has been, correctly, asserted that small firms ‘cannot be given a blanket 
exemption without raising real questions about equality under the law’.
   
 
126
This is surely correct.  The ACCC and/or DPP may choose not to proceed with 
criminal proceedings in certain cases, but this should not be decided based on some 
arbitrary measure of the value of commerce affected.  This has the undesirably 
effect of suggesting to business that some ‘serious cartels’ are in fact not really all 
that serious.
 
 
127
                                                          
122  See, e.g., John Durie, Government cracks the whip, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Feb. 2, 
2005, 56: ‘All cartels are hard core and in this instance the new law should apply to as wide a group of 
offences as possible, including bid rigging, price setting and market sharing’. 
123  Note, however, that in the United Kingdom, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Office 
of Fair Trading and the Serious Fraud Office (who prosecute the offence) indicates that a factor the 
Serious Fraud Office will consider when deciding whether to investigate will be whether the alleged 
fraud exceeds £1 million.  It does, however, make clear that this is simply a ‘signpost of seriousness … 
rather than the main indicator of suitability’ for investigation: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE 5 (October 
2003). 
124  Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 7, ¶2.4. 
125  Id. at 8, ¶2.4.1. This conclusion is, however, reached on the belief that if that were the case then large 
companies could potentially face ‘criminal sanctions for conduct which, if engaged in by smaller 
companies, even as members of the same cartel, would attract the far less serious civil penalties’ which 
is not accurate; the proposed financial thresholds look to value of commerce affected rather than individ-
ual participants.   
126  Editorial, Punishment must fit Crime, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Feb. 2, 2005, 54. 
127  Id. 
  It is akin to saying that all speeding is criminal, but we will only 
fine those who exceed the speed limit by 20km per hour or more.  Such a public 
policy would reduce the deterrent effect of the offence and it is likely that there 
would be an increase in the number of persons driving within 20km over the speed 
limit. 
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Penalties 
The Government proposes that individuals found guilty of the cartel offence should 
be subjected to a maximum of five years imprisonment128 and a fine of up to 
$220,000.  For corporations a maximum fine of ‘the greater of $10 million or three 
times the value of the benefit from the cartel, or where the value cannot be deter-
mined, 10 per cent of annual turnover’ would be available.  For corporations this is 
higher than the existing maximum civil penalty of $10m, but it equates with the 
maximum civil penalty recommended by the Dawson Committee and which forms 
part of the current Amendment Bill.129
The BCA has claimed the proposed fines for corporations are ‘unrealistic’
  Presuming the bill passes through as ex-
pected, it will then be only the nature of the fine as criminal that distinguishes a 
corporation’s penalty from that available under the civil regime. 
 
130 and 
unfair on certain companies.131  Along similar lines the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry has claimed there is no evidence suggesting existing penal-
ties were insufficient, claiming ‘the penalties are quite steep now’.132  There is, 
however, little to support these assertions.  On the contrary, there is a wealth of 
evidence suggesting the current regime is inadequate, most notably the continuing 
prevalence of cartel conduct.133
                                                          
128  The Treasurer notes that by setting a penalty maximum, ‘judges may use their discretion to determine 
the penalty in the particular circumstances before the court, taking into account a range of sentencing 
considerations, including whether there has been previous offending, the circumstances of the victim or 
victims, whether the person has cooperated and the deterrent effect’: Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for 
Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
129 ‘The Government considers financial disincentives for corporations who engage in cartel conduct 
should be at least as strong in the criminal regime as in the civil regime’: Treasurer, Criminal Penalties 
for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
130 See O’Loughlin, supra note 68, at 4. 
131 ‘Business Council of Australia general manager of government and regulatory affairs Steven 
Munchenberg said the prospect of being fined 10 per cent of annual turnover was unfair to companies 
with multiple subsidiaries, which may not have been party to the cartel action, but whose revenue would 
inflate the cost of the penalty’: Speedy, supra note 63. 
132 Chief Executive Peter Hendy, quoted in Speedy, supra note 63. 
133 See Editorial, Punishment must fit Crime, supra note 126, at 54. ‘Business people … cannot … argue 
that the creation of criminal offences for serious cartel conduct is not warranted by its prevalence.’  This 
is evidenced by the fact that the ACCC is currently investigating more than 20 cartels which, given the 
law detection rates of cartels, is a telling figure: see Kate Gauntlett, Cartels can bring jail terms and big 
fines, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 3, 2005, Metro 10. 
  In addition, given the reluctance of the courts in the 
past to impose the maximum fine available, it is likely that courts will continue 
consider factors such as the corporation’s ability to pay and the consequences that 
might flow to staff, shareholders and customers if the company collapses, when 
imposing an appropriate remedy.  Rather than providing ‘steep’ penalties, Australia 
is currently on the low end of the scale when it comes to penalties for cartel con-
duct, and, in those jurisdictions where higher penalties are available (in many cases 
higher than the Government’s proposed maximum penalties) they have had the 
benefit of enabling the imposition of very large fines in appropriate cases, but have 
not proved ‘unrealistic’ for cartel conduct generally.  The simple solution for busi-
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ness worried about large fines is, of course, to refrain from engaging in the unlawful 
conduct.134
For individuals the maximum financial penalty is lower than its civil counterpart in 
recognition of the fact that criminal conviction also attracts other adverse conse-
quences, including ‘strong social stigma’ and disqualification from ‘participation in 
certain activities.’
 
 
135  Nevertheless, a fine at least equal to the civil fine available for 
the same conduct, but absent the ‘dishonest’ element, would be more appropriate.  
It is notable that other jurisdictions have not, when imposing criminal sanctions, 
lowered the fine payable to below that of the civil standard.  In the UK, for exam-
ple, which only recently introduced criminal penalties for cartel conduct, an unlim-
ited maximum fine is available for individuals in addition to a five year maximum 
prison term.  In Ireland, in addition to prison terms, a fine of up to €4 m or 10% of 
turnover is available.136 Similarly, in the United States, the maximum fine for 
individuals is now US$1 million.137
The maximum term of imprisonment of five years is also on the low end of the 
scale when compared with fraud related offences in Australia that range from five 
to ten years, raising some issues of comparability.   Nevertheless, the five years 
does fall within the existing international maximum range of two to ten years.  The 
United States and Mexico
  Australia’s proposed maximum criminal fine is 
strikingly modest by comparison. 
 
138 sit at the top of the scale with up to ten years impris-
onment, Canada, Ireland, Israel and UK all impose maximum jail terms of five 
years, France imposes a four year maximum139
The BCA has claimed that prison sentences for individuals constitute an overreac-
tion by the Government.
 and Japan imposes a three year 
maximum term.  Consequently, while there are some issues of comparability with 
other crime, particularly other white collar crime, in Australia, by international 
standards the five year maximum term is middle-of-the-range.   
 
140  One of the expressed concerns has been that directors 
of large companies, unaware of what is happening, could be subjected to criminal 
fines or imprisonment.141
                                                          
134  See, for example, Punishment to fit the cartel crime, THE AGE, Feb. 4, 2005, 14: ‘In our view, 
reputable companies have nothing to fear from the reforms and Australians have much to gain from fair 
and open competition’. 
135 Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2.  The criminalisation of 
cartel conduct will also mean that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 will apply where an offence is proved. 
136 Competition Act, 2002 (Ireland).  See also Helen Kelly and Karen Gibbons, Ireland, in CARTEL 
REGULATION 2004: GETTING THE FINE DOWN IN 29 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 80-81 (2004). 
137 Recent increase: until the passing of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 
2004 the maximum fine payable by individuals was $350,000 (but note this could be increased) 
138 Federal Law of Economic Competition (Mexico).  See further León Ricardo Elizondo, Mexico, in 
CARTEL REGULATION 2004, supra note 136, at 100-105. 
139  See Didier Théophile and Nathalie Lobel, France, in CARTEL REGULATION 2004, supra note 136, at 
62-68. 
140 Frank Cassidy, Chamber chief says cartel crackdown is overreaction, CANBERRA TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2005, 13. 
141 See, for example, ACT Chamber of Commerce chief executive, Chris Peters, quoted in Cassidy,  
supra note 140, at 13. 
  This concern is, of course, unjustified considering the 
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requirement of individual dishonesty before a director could be exposed to a crimi-
nal conviction.142
In addition to criminal fines and possible jail terms, the range of other remedies that 
exist under the TPA for business and individuals, ‘such as the payment of compen-
sation or injunctions or adverse publicity orders’, as well as the proposed option to 
‘disqualify an individual implicated in a contravention from managing a corpora-
tion’, will also be available for those convicted under the cartel offence.
  These criminal penalties, for both companies and individuals, are 
appropriate given the extent of cartel activity that exists and the treatment of less 
damaging conduct, and are, for reasons outlined earlier, likely to provide a much 
more effective deterrent against the engaging in such conduct.  
   
143
The Government proposes that the ACCC release guidelines, developed in consul-
tation with the DPP, which set out factors that will be ‘relevant to determining 
whether to pursue a criminal or civil investigation.’
    
 
Excluding certain conduct 
Existing exclusions under the civil regime for certain forms of conduct, that might 
otherwise fall within the cartel offence, will be immune from criminal sanction.  
This is appropriate and still remains consistent with the OECD recommendation.  
There should be no practical difficulty in extending these exclusions to the cartel 
offence. 
 
Managing civil and criminal penalties 
The Government has indicated that the same conduct prohibited by the new cartel 
offence, absent the dishonesty element, will also become a per se civil contraven-
tion of the TPA.  This duplication of prohibitions requires some mechanism by 
which the ACCC can determine which contraventions will proceed through the civil 
system and which through the criminal.  In rare cases where conduct has been 
engaged in but the element of dishonesty is absent, the civil system will need to be 
pursued.  In other cases factors set out earlier, such as commerce affected and prior 
contraventions will guide the ACCC’s decision of whether to pursue criminal 
prosecution over civil action.  Other issues might also influence the ACCC’s deci-
sion, such as whether they are likely to be able to prove a contravention ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ as opposed to on the balance of probabilities for civil actions.   
 
144  In particular, as discussed 
earlier, they wish to ensure that criminal sanctions are only pursued ‘where they can 
be clearly justified’145
                                                          
142 Note Graeme Samuel has indicated that ‘senior managers unaware of illegal activities could not be 
prosecuted and sent to jail, because legal processes demanded evidence of complicity’: Cassidy, supra 
note 140, at 13. 
143  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
 and have indicated that the ACCC should not ‘ordinarily 
refer relatively minor matters to the DPP for criminal prosecution.’ 
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In terms of what would justify criminal sanction, the Government has, as outlined 
earlier, focussed on whether a significant amount of commerce is affected.  In 
addition to those ‘size’ factors the ACCC will be required to consider, before refer-
ring a matter to the DPP, whether ‘one or more of the alleged participants has 
previously been found by a court to have participated in, or has admitted to partici-
pating in, cartel conduct, either criminal or civil.’  Similarly, the DPP, in making its 
‘independent determination as to whether to prosecute a particular matter’ must 
consider whether any of the alleged members of the cartel have previously been 
found by a criminal or civil court, or admitted, to have engaged in cartel behaviour’ 
in addition to the evidence available and the Prosecution Policy of the Common-
wealth (the Prosecution Policy).146
The benefits of criminalising cartel conduct will only be realised if they are actively 
pursued by the ACCC and the DPP.  In cases where the ACCC believes a cartel 
offence has taken place and investigation reveals sufficient evidence – or the likeli-
hood of obtaining sufficient evidence – for purposes of criminal prosecution,
  It is suggested that neither prior conduct nor 
commerce affected are appropriate requirements for considering whether alleged 
contraventions of the cartel offence are pursued.  The issue of commerce affected 
was addressed earlier.  In relation to prior contraventions, given the historic diffi-
culty in detecting and proving cartel conduct, particularly prior to the ACCC’s 
leniency policy, proof of prior contravention means very little; the current offenders 
might simply have been involved in successful – undetected – cartels in the past.  
Even if they have not, the deterrent effect for first time offenders is diminished if 
they believe that a clean track record – however accurate – is likely to save them 
from criminal prosecution.  These are considerations more appropriately left to 
sentencing.  Provided the ACCC has the evidence necessary to justify criminal 
proceedings, requiring a higher burden of proof, and whistleblower protection does 
not apply, criminal sanctions should be pursued in all cases. 
 
147 
they must refer the matter to the DPP who must then prosecute.  The regime will 
prove ineffective as a deterrent if individuals believe that in the majority of cases 
the ACCC will simply pursue civil remedies.  Currently, for example, only the 
United States and Canada have successfully pursued jail terms for cartel offences, 
despite the fact that this potential remedy exists in a number of other jurisdic-
tions.148
Another key difficulty will be dealing with the concurrent pursuit of remedies under 
both the civil and criminal regime.  This is likely to occur frequently, as any con-
duct falling within the cartel offence will also automatically contravene the civil 
prohibition which the Government has indicated will be consistent with the criminal 
offence.  In this respect the Law Council, in its submission to the Working Party, 
 
 
                                                          
146  Id. 
147 It is presumed the higher threshold of ‘guilty beyond all reasonable doubt’ will be imposed for the 
cartel offence rather than the existing civil, balance of probabilities test. 
148 See OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 2 and 
Sheridan Scott, Cartel Enforcement: International and Canadian Developments, Speech to the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy 14 (Oct. 7, 2004). 
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suggested that Recommendation 11.2 ALRC Report Principled Regulation should 
be followed,149
This Recommendation is not intended restrict the ability of a regulator to seek 
compensation orders, disqualification orders or preservation orders.
 which provides 
 
Recommendation 11–2. Legislation that provides for exposure to parallel 
criminal proceedings and civil penalty proceedings for the same or sub-
stantially the same conduct should also provide that:  
 
(a)  civil penalty proceedings against a person must be 
stayed if criminal proceedings are commenced, or have 
already been commenced, against that person for a 
criminal offence constituted by conduct that is the same 
or substantially the same as the conduct alleged to con-
stitute the civil penalty contravention; 
(b)  no, or no further, civil penalty proceedings may be taken 
against a person if that person has been convicted of a 
criminal offence constituted by conduct that is the same 
or substantially the same as the conduct alleged to con-
stitute the civil penalty contravention; and 
(c)  if the person is not convicted of that criminal offence, 
the civil penalty proceedings may be resumed. 
 
150
Concurrent civil and criminal prohibition also raises the problem of ensuring that 
any evidence gathered is done so in accordance with criminal standards where 
criminal prosecution is likely to be pursued.  In this respect the Government has 
indicated it is desirable for the ACCC to ‘determine early in an investigation 
whether it will proceed civilly or criminally’ because of the varying evidentiary 
requirements for civil and criminal investigation and prosecution.  However, this 
 
 
This is a logical and sensible recommendation which it appears the Government is 
willing to follow.  The Government has appropriately stated that:  
 
existence of parallel civil and criminal provisions for potentially the same 
conduct could give rise to issues concerning the order in which matters are 
litigated and the appeals process. Therefore, statutory bars will be incorpo-
rated in the Trade Practices Act to provide appropriate protection, for ex-
ample, to stay civil proceedings until criminal proceedings are completed, 
after which time, if the defendant is convicted, the civil proceedings would 
be terminated. 
 
                                                          
149 Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 14. 
150  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PRINCIPLED REGULATION: CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
PENALTIES IN AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL REGULATION, (Commonwealth of Australia, Oct. 2002) 
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may prove difficult in practice,151 as it is likely to be only after significant investi-
gation that the ACCC can make an assessment of whether, in fact, there has been a 
breach and, if so, whether they can acquire the evidence necessary for successful 
criminal prosecution.  In this respect the ACCC and DPP may be guided in the 
development of their MOU, by the UK’s recent  Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office152 and the OFT’s publication outlining powers for investigating criminal 
cartels, which sets out when criminal investigative powers should be used and how 
they differ from evidence gathering in purely civil cases.153
The Government has indicated that ACCC will have the role of investigating possi-
ble breaches of the cartel offence and the DPP will have the role of prosecuting 
cases.  The introduction of a new enforcement body to the competition law regime 
in Australia necessitates an appropriate delineation of responsibilities between the 
ACCC and DPP.  This will be set out in the MOU between these bodies, which will 
also ‘establish standards of cooperation between agencies in the investigation and 
litigation process’, outline channels of communication and ‘specify processes for 
the consideration of immunity applications’.
  Provided these are 
clearly set out through a combination of legislation, where appropriate, and guide-
lines for the DPP and ACCC to follow, this should not prove too problematic in 
practice. 
 
The ACCC and the DPP 
154
Cartels are, by their nature, highly secretive ventures.  As a result, it has been ob-
served that the enforcement costs in order to achieve a high level of detection in 
relation to cartel conduct are extremely high - and perhaps prohibitive.
  Little detail of this aspect of the 
MOU has been released. 
 
 
 
 
Whistleblower protection – leniency 
155
                                                          
151  It has been suggested that the ACCC will be required to decide on day one whether to opt for crimi-
nal or civil penalties: Fred Brenchley, Cartels compelled to come clean, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL 
REVIEW, Feb. 2, 2005, 4.  However, a time frame has not yet been made clear by the government. 
152  MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123, at 5. 
153  OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (UK), POWERS FOR INVESTIGATING CRIMINAL CARTELS (Jan. 2004). 
154  Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
155  Wils, supra note 51, at 22.  See also James Griffin,  
… cartels are secret conspiracies.  Cartel members simply do not broadcast to the 
world that they have met and agreed to limit output and raise prices.  On the contrary, 
cartel members go to great lengths to avoid detection of their fraudulent conduct.  More 
often that not, even the customers of the cartel members are unaware that they are be-
ing victimized.  These characteristics of a cartel make it one of the most difficult white 
collar crimes to investigate and prosecute. 
quoted in Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 16. 
 If in-
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creased detection measures are not put in place, and the perception that only a 
remote possibility that breaches of Part IV will be detected is allowed to flourish, 
then any other measures that are employed to encourage compliance with Part IV 
are likely to be futile.  
 
The Law Council of Australia, in its submission to the Working Party therefore, 
sensibly, recommended that the amnesty currently available under the civil regime 
be available under the criminal regime,156 provided this could be done without the 
DPP retaining its approach to amnesty ‘which retains significant prosecutorial 
discretion.’157
An effective leniency policy is increasingly being recognised as a crucial element in 
the deterrence of cartels as well as penalties for individuals.
 
 
158  This is because such 
policies increase the risk of detection of cartels and will, therefore, be an important 
factor for individuals to contemplate when considering whether to engage in such 
conduct.  In relation to deterrence generally, that it is clear that the greater the 
perceived likelihood of detection, the more likely it is that prospective offenders 
will be dissuaded from offending.159
[s]trong sanctions against enterprises and individuals increase the effec-
tiveness of leniency programs in uncovering cartels and provide incentives 
to cartel participants to co-operate with a cartel investigation.’
  In this respect, the OECD has reported that  
 
160
This has proved to be the case under the existing policy, with the ACCC believes its 
has proved ‘a very effective incentive for exposing cartels’
 
 
161  This formal leniency 
policy for cartel conduct offers immunity from ACCC instigated proceedings162 
where the applicant was the ‘first to disclose the existence of a cartel of which the 
ACCC was previously unaware; or immunity from pecuniary penalty, where the 
leniency applicant is the first to make an application for leniency in relation to a 
cartel of which the ACCC was aware, but in relation to which the ACCC had insuf-
ficient evidence to commence court proceedings.’163
A recent successful example of the application of the ACCC’s leniency policy arose 
in the context of a price-fixing arrangement between Metro Brick and Midland 
 
 
                                                          
156  Law Council of Australia, Submission to Working Party, supra note 99, at 20. 
157  Id. at 20. 
158  See Id. at 15 and OECD, FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 73, AT 82. 
159  This was acknowledged by the Dawson Committee who noted that ‘certainty of detection is a better 
deterrent than severity of punishment for most criminal offences’: Dawson Report, supra note 31, at 158.  
See also Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2: ‘international experi-
ence suggests that immunity programmes have been highly successful in combating cartel activity. 
Therefore, an immunity policy enhances the deterrent effect of criminal penalties.’ 
160 OECD, REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 3, at 2. 
161  Press Release, ACCC, ACCC further steps up fight against Cartels (Nov. 24, 2004). 
162  Note that the policy provides no protection from third party claims.  However, these are rare and, in 
any event, third parties are not able to claim pecuniary penalties. 
163  McNeill, supra note 11.  This is subject to other conditions set out in the policy: ACCC, ACCC 
LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 14. 
2005 Criminal Penalties   31     
 
Brick relating to clay bricks in Western Australia.  Following an allegation of price 
fixing by the ACCC in 2001 ‘Boral Ltd, of which Midland Brick is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, approached the ACCC and voluntarily disclosed the potential contraven-
tions.’164  Subsequently the court imposed a penalty of $1 million on Metro Brick 
and a penalty of $25,000, a senior manager of Metro Brick, for their involvement in 
the price-fixing.  Midland Brick received an injunction restraining them from en-
gaging in similar conduct for five years and was ordered to pay costs to the ACCC.  
However, both Midland Brick and the senior manager involved avoided pecuniary 
penalty.165  More recently, Amcor sought leniency from the ACCC in exchange for 
information about the cartel conduct in the corrugated box business and full coop-
eration with ACCC investigations and proceedings.  This conduct is currently being 
investigated.166
It is proposed that the Prosecution Policy be amended to enable immunity to be 
granted at an early stage in an investigation. This would be on the recommendation 
of the ACCC, and where the applicant meets certain conditions.
 
 
It is important that the Government incorporate a leniency policy into the criminal 
cartel regime and it has indicated that it will do so in the form of a whistleblower 
protection policy.  Guidelines are to be formulated to determine when immunity 
will be provided to whisleblowers by the DPP. 
 
An immunity policy is generally accepted to be more effective when immunity can 
be offered in the early stages of an investigation. However, in Australia, the discre-
tion to provide immunity from criminal proceedings is currently exercised by the 
DPP at the conclusion of an investigation. The exercise of this discretion is guided 
by the Prosecution Policy. 
 
167
                                                          
164  Press Release, ACCC, $1 million penalty for brick price fix (June 9, 2004). 
165  Id. 
166  Amcor applied for leniency on 22 November 2004 after becoming aware of cartel conduct by officers 
and employees on 19 November: AMCOR LIMITED, HALF-YEAR REPORT, 12-13 (Dec. 31 2004).  The 
revelations of cartel conduct by Amcor have led to resignations of its Chief Executive Officer, Russell 
Jones, and two other senior managers (see ACCC heavies packaging giant Amcor  (Dec. 8, 2004) 
available at ABC online <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1260358.htm>.  See further Kate  
Askew, Former Amcor executives escape, THE AGE, Dec. 18, 2004 (online) at  
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/Former-Amcor-executives-
escape/2004/12/17/1102787275472.html>. 
167 Treasurer, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Behaviour, supra note 2. 
 
 
To maximize incentives for potential whistleblowers, the Government recom-
mended that: 
 
the first party to approach authorities before they are aware of the cartel 
should receive the most favourable treatment. If parties delay until there is 
sufficient evidence to institute proceedings or they are not the first to ap-
proach the authorities, they should not receive immunity. 
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The proposed criteria for the grant of immunity will be similar to those existing 
under the ACCC’s current leniency policy.  In particular, a whistleblower will 
receive immunity only if: 
 
• the ACCC was not already aware of the conduct;  
• the party was the first to come forward (subsequent applicants for immu-
nity should be dealt with under the existing provisions in the Prosecution 
Policy);  
• the party was not a clear individual leader in the cartel;  
• the party had not coerced anyone to join the cartel; and  
• the party fully cooperates with the ACCC and attends court to give evi-
dence, as required.168
 
Provided the DPP’s Prosecution Policy is amended as suggested by the Govern-
ment and the new whistleblower protection policy does not weaken the ACCC’s 
existing and successful leniency policy, this is an essential component of an effec-
tive cartel enforcement regime and should assist in both detection and effective 
prosecution of the new cartel offence as well as adding another layer of deterrent 
for those contemplating cartel conduct. 
  
VII RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
It is as yet unclear how the Government’s proposals will be incorporated into the 
TPA.  As indicated above, the preferred method would be to incorporate them in 
such a way as to cause minimum disruption to existing provisions for which there is 
substantial jurisprudence.  This way the authorities, parties and courts could draw, 
as much as possible, on existing definitions that would help inform the application 
of the cartel offence and the amended civil per se offence. 
 
The most appropriate way to do this would be through the modification of section 
45 of the TPA, which currently encompasses all forms of cartel conduct whether 
directly or with the aid of associated provisions which deem certain forms of con-
duct, like price fixing, to substantially lessen competition.  In particular, the existing 
s 45A should be repealed and replaced with a new s 45A deeming all forms of 
cartel conduct outlined in the Government’s proposal to substantially lessen compe-
tition for the purposes of s 45; that is, making them all subject to per se civil pen-
alty. 
 
This is relatively easy for price-fixing which has an established definition in the 
TPA; the other forms of hard core conduct are caught either via the price fixing 
provision or more generally by s 45 only if they substantially lessen competition 
                                                          
168  Id. 
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and have no existing definition within the TPA.169
                                                          
169  Output restrictions and bid rigging are potentially caught as forms of price fixing by s 45A; sharing 
or dividing markets on the other hand is likely to be caught by s 45 only if it can be demonstrated the 
conduct substantially lessened competition. 
  It is suggested the following 
definitions would be appropriate. 
 
Section 45A: Cartelisation 
 
(1) Price Fixing 
A provision of contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, shall be deemed for the purposes 
of section 45 to have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition if the provision has the purpose, or has or is likely to 
have the effect of  
(a) fixing, controlling or maintaining, or  
(b) providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of 
the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation 
to, goods or services supplied or acquired or to be supplied or ac-
quired by  
(c) the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or  
(d) the proposed parties to the proposed contract, arrangement or  
  understanding, or  
(e) by any of them, or  
(f) by any bodies corporate that are related to any of them 
in competition with each other. 
 
(2) Output Restrictions 
A provision of contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, shall be deemed for the purposes 
of section 45 to have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition if the provision has the purpose, or has or is likely to 
have the effect of restricting the output of goods or services supplied or to 
be supplied by  
(a) the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or  
(b) the proposed parties to the proposed contract, arrangement or  
  understanding, or  
(c) by any of them, or  
(d) by any bodies corporate that are related to any of them 
in competition with each other. 
 
(3) Bid Rigging 
A provision of contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, between two or more persons, 
shall be deemed for the purposes of section 45 to have the purpose, effect, 
or likely effect of substantially lessening competition if, in response to a 
call for tenders, 
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(a) one or more parties agree to not submit a bid; or 
(b) two or more parties submit bids arrived at by agreement or ar-
rangement170
(c) if the Court cannot determine the value of that benefit – 10% of 
the annual turnover of the body corporate during the period of 12 
months ending at the end of the month in which the act or omis-
sion occurred.
 
 
and the person who called for the tenders was not made aware of any 
agreement or arrangement, at or before the time at which bids were sub-
mitted. 
 
(4) Market Sharing 
A provision of contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, between two or more persons, two 
or more of whom are in competition with each other, shall be deemed for 
the purposes of section 45 to have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition if it has the purpose or effect of sharing 
markets between two or more of the cartel members, whether by customer, 
geographic or any other criteria. 
 
Finally, the parallel criminal offence of cartel conduct could be incorpo-
rated as s 45AA of the TPA, providing that all forms of conduct prescribed 
in s 45A, which have been engaged in dishonestly, are prohibited.  For ex-
ample: 
 
 
 
 
Section 45AA: Cartel Offence 
(1) A corporation which, dishonestly, engages in any of the forms of conduct 
set out in s 45A, is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by a fine 
not exceeding, for each act or omission, the greatest of the following: 
(a)  $10,000,000; 
(b)  if the Court can determine the value of the benefit that the body 
corporate, and any body corporate related to the body corporate, 
have obtained directly or indirectly and that is reasonably attrib-
utable to the act or omission – 3 times the value of that benefit; 
171
(2) An individual who, dishonestly, engages in any of the forms of conduct set 
out in s 45A, is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by a fine not 
 
                                                          
170  Note that this is similar to the Canadian prohibition on bid rigging: Competition Act, § 47 (Canada). 
171  Note that this wording essentially mirrors that in the Amendment Bill relating to civil pecuniary 
penalties: Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005, Schedule 9 §4.   It would also be 
necessary to ensure that the proposed new s 76(5), which defines ‘annual turnover’ for purposes of the 
new pecuniary penalty regime, was re-worded to ensure it also applied to the new s 45AA: Trade 
Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2005, Schedule 9 §7. 
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exceeding $220,000 (or such amount as prescribed by regulation) or im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding five year, or both. 
 
This approach would be consistent with how the TPA deals with overlapping civil 
and criminal provisions in relation to consumer protection and would cause less 
disruption to the existing regime, thus reducing the level of uncertainty associated 
with new laws. 
 
Naturally, there would need to be some associated changes.  Part VI of the TPA 
dealing with remedies would then need to accommodate the new provisions, includ-
ing providing some different criteria for investigating potential breaches of the 
cartel offence.  Anti-overlap provisions would also need to be modified.  Currently, 
for example, entering into an exclusionary provisions takes precedence over other s 
45 contraventions where there is overlap.  This would need to be altered to ensure 
that this did not occur in all cases and could be done simply by providing that s 45A 
and 45AA take precedence over s 45(2)(a) and all other provisions of Part IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
 
In order to ensure the changes apply to individuals as well as corporations, changes 
need to be made to the text of the Competition Code.172  This change requires 
consultation with the States and Territories over a period of at least three months.173  
At the expiry of three months the Commonwealth may ‘call a vote on each of the 
proposed amendments by sending written notice’ to each participating jurisdic-
tion.174  The Commonwealth has two votes and a casting vote and each other par-
ticipating jurisdiction has one vote.175  If a jurisdiction fails to vote within 35 days 
of the Commonwealth’s notice it will be ‘taken to have voted in favour of the 
amendment’.176
                                                          
172  The Competition Code comprises a schedule version of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 
(Cth) designed to extend the scope of that Part to areas outside the federal Government’s constitutional 
powers.  
173  ‘The Commonwealth will consult with fully-participating jurisdictions before it puts forward for 
parliamentary consideration any modification to Part IV of the Trade Practices Act of to the Competition 
Code text’: Conduct Code Agreement, §6(1).  Section 7 further requires that consultation be by written 
notice and allow parties a period of three months to respond. 
174  Conduct Code Agreement, §6(3). 
175  Conduct Code Agreement, §6(4). 
176  Conduct Code Agreement, §6(5). 
  Despite Labor governments in the States, it is likely that the Com-
monwealth will obtain the necessary votes given Labor has indicated that it wel-
comes the introduction of criminal sanctions.  At this stage it is, therefore, 
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anticipated that the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct) Bill 2005 will be 
introduced into Parliament sometime in June or August and come into force by the 
end of the year.177
IX CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
It will also be important for the MOU and ACCC guidelines, including guidelines 
on the whisteblower policy to be developed between now and the time at which any 
amendments are likely to take effect.  This will provide some increased certainty for 
business contemplating engaging in such conduct or in confessing to having en-
gaged in that conduct. 
 
 
The current civil penalty regime for hard core cartel conduct has fallen well behind 
international best practice.  It provides insufficient deterrence against cartel conduct 
and raises issues of fairness when compared to other similar and often less damag-
ing forms of conduct that attract criminal penalties. 
 
The introduction of higher civil penalties, together with a new criminal penalty 
regime for cartel conduct, including the prospect of jail time for offenders, should 
go some way to addressing these issues; in particular, it is likely to prove a more 
effective deterrent against cartel conduct which is estimated to cost the international 
economy billions of dollars each year. 
 
It is hoped these changes will be implemented quickly and will be implemented in 
such a way as to cause minimum disruption to existing law.  It is further hoped that 
the Government revises its criteria for determining if and when it will pursue crimi-
nal proceedings, in particular, by removing reference to cartel or business size as a 
criteria.  All forms of conduct proposed to be criminalised are almost universally 
considered ‘hard core’ and should prima facie be treated in the same way be the 
authorities, less arguments of fairness and equality arise. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
177  Parliament is not sitting in July.  See also Rowland, supra note 40. Note, while the government has 
not publicly indicated a timeframe this appears a reasonable estimate.  See supra note 40.   
